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Abstract 
In this study, we construct two new datasets that consist of spinoffs and mergers to 
investigate how the effects of spinoffs or mergers vary across countries (excluding U.S.). 
Although the values created by spinoffs represent the relative superiority of the external 
capital markets over the internal capital markets, we find that spinoffs create less value in 
countries with more developed capital markets. We also find that post-merger firms 
benefit from large and efficient external markets. In addition, we provide evidence on the 
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Chapter One; Introduction 
Most of the studies on efficiency are confined to the same external capital market -
the U.S. However, whether using internal capital market can create value is a statement 
relative to the efficiency of external capital market. Intuitively, funds would flow towards 
firms that would generate most value in an efficient external capital market. It is rational 
to argue that the benefit of using internal capital market, either measured by the value 
created by spinoffs or the value destroyed by mergers, should be decreasing in the 
efficiency of external capital market. To our knowledge, there is no research trying to test 
this hypothesis. 
To shed light on diversification debate, we construct a new dataset to conduct a 
broad cross-country examination. We employ two separate samples of corporate spinoffs 
and mergers outside the U.S. to test benefit or cost arising from changes in diversification 
strategies. Our sample consists of 127 spinoffs and 227 mergers announced during 1996-
2003 and taken from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database. 
Based on the data we collected, we test the following hypotheses. 
HI: Value created by spinofffirm is increasing in the efficient external capital market, 
H2: Value created by merged firm is decreasing in the efficient external capital market, 
and 
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H3: Value created by a firm is positively related to its performance improvement. 
Our primary objective is to use spinoffs and mergers data to make a cross-country 
comparison of the internal capital markets after controlling the variation in external 
capital market. Since spinoffs break away from internal capital market and access to 
external capital market, it allows us to examine the impact of external capital market to 
the firm value. Mergers are simply the reverse of spinoffs and firms receive funding in 
internal capital markets. Given different level of information asymmetry and financial 
infrastructure in these economies, spinoff or merger could impact firm value in a 
differential way. Because the values created by spinoffs represent the relative superiority 
of the external capital markets over the internal capital markets, it is expected to find that 
spinoffs create more values and mergers incur greater loss in countries with more 
efficient capital markets. As stock market values and accounting information are 
available for both parent firms, subsidiary firms, and post-merger firms, this allow us to 
measure the effect of spinoffs and examine the potential sources of value gains or losses. 
Surprisingly, we find that in the efficient external market, spinoffs create less value as 
well as mergers create more value and these results are significant. 
We also seek to provide evidence on whether the value increase or decrease we 
document for spinoffs or mergers are coming from performance improvements. We 
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capture performance of firms by examining the change in return on assets, it is because 
accounting information is available, and the measure is no need to make adjustments. Our 
results show that operating improvements are significantly related to value creations in 
both spinoffs and mergers cases. 
The rest of the paper is set up as follows. Next section briefly presents some of the 
arguments discussed in the literature about the effect of diversification strategies and 
discusses our hypotheses. After describing the sample and the data in Section 3, we 
describe the methodology used to compute abnormal returns and performance and 
present the results in Section 4. Additional analysis on spinoffs and mergers are analyzed 
in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
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Chapter Two: Related Literature and hypotheses 
Recent years have witnessed heavy restructuring programs that include merges and 
acquisitions and spinoffs. Does corporate restructuring enhance firm value and 
performance? This issue has been very controversial for long. Theoretical arguments 
documented that diversification could have value-enhancing effects as well as value-
reducing effects. Myers and Majluf s (1984) assertion is that resources are allocated 
efficiently as diversification creates a larger internal capital market. The potential benefits 
of operating a large firm are able to reduce financing costs and information gaps relative 
to single-division firm since management from multidivisional firm is better informed 
about investment opportunities than outsiders (Stein, 1997). If an internal capital market 
is efficient, an increase in the investment opportunities should increase the amount of 
resources transfer to more productive segments, hence diversification increases firm 
value in internal capital market financing. Williamson's (1986)^ Information Cost Theory 
implies that internal capital market financing has positive effect on the firm in the other 
way, which is reducing under-investment costs. As asymmetric information between 
investors and the manager exists, under-pricing of new securities is resulted and therefore 
firm would choose to discard projects with net present value. So firms are likely to fund 
‘See Lundstrum (2003). 
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their investment with internally generated cash rather than external financing to avoid 
selling under-pricing securities. Stulz (1990) makes a similar argument, he contends that 
a larger internal capital market is able to reduce under-investment problem. 
When diversity in resources and opportunities increases, however, the potential 
costs of diversification rise. Jensen's (1986) Free Cash Flow Theory makes an argument 
regarding the management. Managers are likely to undertake value-decreasing 
investments when there is unused borrowing power and free cash flows. "An internal 
capital market increases the availability of cash, therefore exacerbating agency costs" 
(Lundstrum, 2003). In addition, Burch and Nanda (2003) suggest diversity in investment 
opportunities is a source of value loss for diversified firms. Diversity cost hypothesis 
states that diversity investment opportunities across divisions increase divisional transfer, 
exacerbate intra-firm rent seeking, and worsen the diversification discount. Raj an et al. 
(2000) build a model and show that when diversity in resources and opportunities 
increases, resources can flow toward the most inefficient division and lead to inefficient 
investment. They argue that bargaining between divisional managers and corporate 
headquarters induce misallocation of resources across divisions; least productive 
divisions receive transfer from the most productive divisions. Scharfstein and Stein (2000) 
develop a two-tiered agency model and show that managers from weaker divisions can 
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subvert the workings of an internal capital market by extracting greater overall 
compensation from the CEO rather than bargaining for preferential capital budgeting 
allocations. The rent-seeking behaviours of managements in a larger internal capital 
market enlarge the agency costs. Some recent papers ascribe these diversification 
discounts to agency problems. Furthermore, systematic differences between divisions of a 
diversified firm and single-segment firms aggravate the situation. According to Burch 
and Nanda (2003), diversity limit the ability of strong divisions to hire or retain top talent 
when weak divisions are perceived to harm overall firm performance or employee morale. 
Numerous empirical studies show that diversified firms trade at discount. Berger 
and Ofek (1995) compare actual firm value to the firm value computed by sum of stand-
alone values for individual business segments, they find that diversified firms valued at a 
13% to 15% discount and the value loss is due to over-investment as well as cross-
subsidization. In sharp contrast, Desai and Jain (1999) document significant value 
creation in a three-year period after spinoff and they find that value enhance comes from 
operating performance improvement. 
Corporate acquirers systematically dismantling diversified firms during the 1980s is 
a clue for deriving that the divisions would be more efficiently run in an external capital 
market financing environment. In these cases, firms prefer to fund their investments in an 
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external capital market rather than internal capital financing, which corporate 
headquarters owns the divisions and allocate capital. 
Based on the above discussion, we state our hypotheses 
HI: Spinofffirm 's value is increasing in the efficient external capital market, and 
H2: Merged firm 's value is decreasing in the efficient external capital market 
against the alternative hypothesis that firm value is unrelated to internal or external 
capital market financing. 
First, we use spinoff observations to test HI. A corporate spinoff is defined as 
splitting a company into two separately traded entities. It involves a pro rata distribution 
of the parent firm's ownership in the subsidiary to the parent's shareholders. Hereafter, 
We refer to the pre-spinofF and continuing entity as the parent, and the spun-off unit as 
the subsidiary, even though there is no parent or subsidiary relation following the spinoff. 
Free Cash Flow Theory implies that firm realizes a value decreasing effect from internal 
capital market funding. Conversely, spinoff breaks away from internal capital market and 
accesses to external capital market, thus spinoff should realize a value-increasing effect. 
To test the second hypothesis, we use merger observations. A merger is the opposite 
of a spinoff and two firms become one in this case. A larger internal capital market is 
created shortly after completing merge as bidders acquire target firms and target firms 
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cease to exist. If Information Cost Theory is correct, mergers should realize value 
increasing from access to internal capital market. 
In addition, we purpose the third hypothesis 
H3: Firm 's value is positively related to its performance improvement. 
This hypothesis is logical as any improvement in operating performance benefits 
the firm and thus enhances firm values and performance change may be unrelated to 
whether the firm is financed by internal or external capital market. 
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Chapter Three: Sample selection and methodology 
A. Sample selection 
In order to test whether corporate diversification strategies create or destroy value, 
a sample of public firms completed spinoffs was developed. As extensive research has 
worked on the U.S. cases, this study is confined to cases except the U.S. 
We first used the M&A module of the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database 
to obtain a sample of public listed spinoff firms in all sectors except financial sector (i.e., 
SICs 6000-6999) that were spun-off during the time period 1996-2003. Firms with 
financial services segments are removed from consideration, as the valuation methods we 
use are not applicable for those firms. Clearly, some firms in the financial services 
industry do not have accounting information, which is important for us but is not 
meaningful for such companies. SDC data include announcement, effective dates and a 
brief description on each event. We exclude cases in which the announcement date or the 
name of newly formed company could not be found in Lexis-Nexis database. To be 
includes in the sample, accounting data for both parent and subsidiary firms must be 
available in Thomson Financial or Worldscope and operate at the same geographic region. 
Imposing these criteria reduced the sample engaged in spinoffs. Our final sample 
consists of 132 subsidiaries spun-off in 127 different spinoffs by 117 companies from 21 
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countries, including Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Hong Kong, India, Italy, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, South 
Africa, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand and United Kingdom. 1 parent 
spun-off three subsidiaries in the same spinoff, and 3 parent spun-off two subsidiaries at a 
time. 9 parents have two spinoffs and 1 parent has three spinoffs separated by multiple 
years. There are 34 spinoffs where parent and subsidiary operate at the same two-digit 
SIC code while 93 spinoffs arise where parent and subsidiary operate at different two-
digit SIC code. We classified a spinoff as focus-increasing spinoff if the two-digit SIC 
code of subsidiary is different from the two-digit SIC code of the parent. The remaining 
spinoffs are classified as the non-focus-increasing spinoff. 
Table 1 reports the frequency of spinoff sample firms by completion year. The 
spinoffs appear heavily in recent years. Table 2 provides a description of the data. The 
pre-spinoff data are based on fiscal year end information prior to the spinoff 
announcement, and the post-spinoff data are based on the first full fiscal year end 
information. The mean book value of total assets of the pre-spinoff firm is US$8183 
million and spinoff size numbers show that spinoffs unload a mean of 29.7% of the total 
assets value of the pre-spinoff entity. 
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TABLE 1 & TABLE 2 HERE 
Another sample of merger is developed by the similar approach. We used the M&A 
module of the SDC database to obtain a sample of public listed merger firms in all sectors 
except financial sector (i.e., SICs 6000-6999) that were merged during the time period 
1996-2003. SDC data include announcement, effective dates and a brief description on 
each event. To be includes in the sample, accounting data for both acquirer and target 
must be available in Worldscope and operate at the same geographic region. The term 
acquirer means the firm that acquires another firm and continuing entity. The term target 
means the firm that merged with acquirer and no longer exists. 
Our final sample consists of 236 targets merged with 210 acquirers in 227 different 
divestitures from 11 countries, including Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, India, 
Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, South Korea, Sweden and United Kingdom. 6 
acquirers merged with 3 targets in the same divestiture, and 3 acquirers merged with 2 
targets at a time. There are 126 mergers where acquirer and target firms operate at the 
same two-digit SIC code while 101 spinoffs arise where acquirer and target firms operate 
at different two-digit SIC code. We classified a merger as cross industry merger if the 
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two-digit SIC code of target is different from the two-digit SIC code of the acquirer. The 
remaining mergers are classified as the own industry merger. 
Table 3 reports the frequency of merger sample firms by completion year. 
TABLE 3 HERE 
B. Methodology 
1. Buy-and-hold return 
Buy-and-hold return for each stock i is computed as R. , = ~ — , where P��is 
V y 
the closing day price of stock i of the holding period and P. ^ is the price of stock i on the 
starting date. We compute excess returns on holding one-year, two-year, three-year and 
announcement period. Beginning with the completion date, new company is established 
in the spinoff case while the target company ceases to exist in the merge case, thus the 
market model is not appropriate in computing the excess returns over the post-spinoff or 
post-merger period. We therefore calculate the excess returns over this period by 
subtracting market index returns, ie. 
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where MKT\^ x is the local market return. In case is positive, then excess returns 
are said to be generated. The /-statistic of the average holding period abnormal return for 
the entire sample {ART) is computed as 
t = ART/SET 
where SET is the cross-sectional standard error of ART. 
2. Operating performance changes 
In addition to the buy-and-hold return, we follow Daley et al. (1997) to examine if 
there is any operating performance improvement of the sample firms. We employed the 
ratio of return on assets (ROA) around the time of spinoff, from year-1 to year +2, as the 
measurement for performance. The reason for us to select ROA as performance measure 
is that we would like to document operating performance changes that are separate from 
the effects of taxes. Since taxation varies across countries, so tax expense are excluded to 
isolate the performance effects in this examination. 
ROA is defined as the ratio of operating income to total assets; year 0 is the year of 
completing spinoff. For the post-spinoff period, ROA is calculated by combining data 
from the separate entities into a single portfolio, that is, sum of operating earning of 
parent and subsidiary to the sum of assets of parent and subsidiary: 
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ROA — OpemtingIncomep_t + OpemUngIncomesubs_,,， 
一 TotalAssets— +TotaMssets •叩 ‘ 
By comparing the ROA measures for the pre-spinoff firm to that for the combined 
parent and subsidiary in the post-spinoff period, we can see if there is significant 
improvement in ROA for these spinoff firms. 
An appropriate benchmark for measuring abnormal performance is crucial. Here we 
select the median return on assets for all firms except the spinoff firm i, which has the 
same two-digit SIC code, as the benchmark (JROAi,i). The industry adjusted ROA (AROA) 
is computed by subtracting the industry benchmark IROA from the ROA of the spinoff 
firm, ie. 
AROAu = ROAij-IROAi,t. 
We then use A AROA as the change of industry adjusted ROA for each spinoff firm: 
l^AROAi = AROAi,post - AROAt^pre . 
Then we report the mean/median ROA, AROA, Is. ROA and A AROA across the sample. 
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Chapter Four; Valuation Results 
A. Empirical Results 
Free Cash Flow Theory and Diversity Cost Hypothesis suggest that diversification 
is value decreasing in the internal capital market operation. So, we first test if spinoffs 
would realize a value-increasing effect as spinoff break away from internal capital market 
and access to external capital market, and then we test the prediction arises from the 
above theory that mergers would realize a value-decreasing effect as merges create larger 
internal capital market so that funds are inefficiently allocated. We then provide evidence 
on whether the value change arises from performance change. At last, we present results 
from cross-sectional regressions to provide evidence of the effects operating performance 
and the efficiency of external capital market on the stock market performance. 
1. Long-run stock market performance 
i. Stock market performance of the firms following spinoff 
In this section, we investigate whether the long run stock market return of these 
spinoff firms are also lower than previous studies. In calculating the buy-and-hold returns, 
if a stock in the sample stops trading for any reason for a particular closing date, then we 
capture buy-and-hold returns by using the nearest trading date's available stock price. 
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Table 4 presents summary statistics for the holding period returns for the pro-forma 
combined firms following the completion of the spinoffs. Stock price for pro-forma 
combined firm at time t is calculated as follow: 
Pt = Pparent, t X No. of shaiCS OUtStandingparent + Psubsidiary, t X No. of shaiCS 
OUtStandingsubsidiary. 
The abnormal returns for the full sample for holding periods of one-year (month +1 
to month +12)，two-year (month +1 to month +24) and three-year (month +1 to month 
+36) are 3.01% (^-statistic of 1.27)，1.93% (/-statistic of 0.47) and 9.81% (/-statistic of 
1.66). Although these abnormal returns are statistically lower than previous study?，it is 
reasonably large in a three-year period and weakly significant. 
TABLE 4 HERE 
We further split the measure of pro-forma combined firms' stock market 
performance into two components: the parent firms and the subsidiary firms. 
Table 5 presents summary statistics on the stock market performance of parents 
following spinoffs. It shows that the abnormal returns for the entire parents over the 
2 Desai and Jain (1999) report the average abnormal return in one-, two- and three-years are 7.69%, 12.7% 
and 19.82 (significant at the 1% level). 
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period of one-, two- and three-years are 18.47% (^-statistic of 9.26)，6.44% (/-statistic of 
1.07) and 22.12% (/-statistic of 2.24). These significant results indicate that parents 
exhibit a strong positive performance following the spinoffs in the one- and the three-
year holding period. 
TABLE 5 HERE 
Table 6 presents summary statistics on the stock market performance of 
subsidiaries following spinoff. It shows that the abnormal returns for the entire sample 
over the period of one-, two- and three-years are 0.43%, 3.81% and 11.75% (广statistic of 
1.73) respectively. 
The results suggest that the stock market performance of the parents are stronger 
than the subsidiaries as there are less investment opportunities in the parents firms 
compared to pre-spinoff periods and thus reduce the inter-divisions transfer and thus 
generate value. There is little benefit for the subsidiaries in the external capital market 
financing. 
TABLE 6 HERE 
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ii. Stock market performance of mergers 
Table 7 presents summary statistics on the stock market performance of post-
merger combined firms. It shows that the abnormal returns for the entire subsidiaries over 
the period of one-, two- and three-years are 5.20%, 7.18% and 23.24% (^-statistic of 3.99) 
respectively. By construct the above analysis of the valuation on post-merger firms, we 
show that the mean excess value is positive and the number for holding three-year period 
is significantly different from zero，that means the firms are perform well even they 
financed by internal capital markets. 
TABLE 7 HERE 
2. Accounting performance 
i. Accounting performance around spinoff 
In this section, we examine the changes in operating performance following 
spinoffs and to gain insight on the relationship between firm value and its performance. 
Similar to the analysis of the stock market performance, we use a benchmark for every 
comparison. Here, we use one matching firm with the same two-digit SIC code as the 
sample firm for the analysis. 
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Table 8 presents summary statistics on the operating performance and the changes 
of operating performance of combined firms around spinoffs. Panel A shows that the 
mean AROA for the entire sample on the pre-spinoff year (hereafter year-1), spinoff year 
(hereafter year 0)，one- (here after year 1)，and two-year (here after year 2) following 
spinoff are 0.79%, 2.81%, 0.60% and 4.20% respectively. The median AROA on the 
above-mentioned years is 0%, 1.88% (significant at the 5% level), 1.60% (significant at 
the 5% level) and 0.70% respectively. On average, spinoff firms perform quite well on 
year 0 and year 1 compared with its industry peers. 
Panel B shows that the median A AROA for the entire sample are 1.23%，1.22%,-
0.02% and -0.94% from year - 1 to +1，form year - 1 to 0，from year 0 to +1 and from 
year +1 to +2 respectively. The first two numbers are significant at 10% and 5% level, 
which means the change of operating performance is mainly driven by the outstanding 
performance in the spinoff year. 
TABLE 8 HERE 
ii. Accounting performance around merger 
Table 9 presents summary statistics on the operating performance of combined 
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firms around merge. Panel A shows that the mean AROA for the entire sample on the year 
-1，year +1 and year +2 are 2.07% (significant at the 1% level), 1.88% (significant at the 
5% level) and 1.21% respectively. The median AROA on the above-mentioned years is 
1.01% (significant at the 1% level), 0.79% (significant at the 1% level) and 1.15% 
(significant at the 1% level) respectively. The results suggest that the combined firm 
operating performance is consistently strong relative to their industry peers. 
Panel B presents summary statistics on the change of operating performance of 
combined firms around merge. It shows that the A AROA for the entire sample are -0.05%, 
-0.55%, 0.46% and 0.18% from year - 1 to year +1，form year - 1 to 0, from year 0 to +1 
and from year +1 to +2 respectively. 
Though no significant performance enhance are found in this sample, the evidence 
of post-merger firms consistently outperform their industry peers suggests that managers 
become more efficient in resources allocation as merger creates a larger internal capital 
market. 
TABLE 9 HERE 
3. Regression analysis 
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Our sample involves several countries; some are in emerging markets like Thailand 
and India, the others may come from mature or well-developed markets, for example 
Hong Kong and Australia. In higher income countries, stock markets tend to be larger, 
more active and more efficient. Because the level of information asymmetry, capital 
market imperfection, contract enforcement, law tradition and other financial structures 
are different across countries, it allows us to facilitate international comparison on the 
relationship between external market efficiency and firm value. 
In this section, we present results from a regressions to provide evidence of the 
effects of market size, activities, efficiency and operating performance on the stock 
market performance of spinoff. Following Demirguc-Kunt and Levin, "to measure 
market size, we use Market capitalization as a share of GDP’ which equals the ratio of 
the value of domestic equities (that are traded on domestic exchanges) to GDP. To 
measure market activity, we use Total value traded as a share of GDP, which equals the 
value of the trades of domestic equities on domestic exchanges divided by GDP. Total 
value traded as a share of GDP measures the value of stock transaction relative to the 
size of the economy. Total value traded as a share of GDP is frequently used gauge 
market liquidity because it measures trading relative to economic activity. Finally, to 
measure the efficiency of the market, we use the Turnover ratio, which equals the value 
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of the trades of domestic equities on domestic exchanges as a share of the value of 
equities... the Turnover ratio measures the value of stock transactions relative to the size 
of the market, and it is frequently used as a measure of market liquidity" (Demirguc-Kunt 
and Levin^ 2001). 
i. Regression analysis for spinoffs {HI and H3) 
In regression 1 of Table 10，we report on several specifications of the following 
cross-sectional regression model for spinoffs: 
Ri= a + b (A Operating Performance)c (Market Size')! + d (Market Activity,i + 
e (Market Efficiency/*)i 
The coefficient on change in operating performance is positive and significant. It 
consistent to our hypothesis 3 that market's positive valuation to the firm incorporates 
improved operating performance following spinoff. Coefficients of market size and the 
level of market activities are insignificant. Turnover ratio is a proxy for measuring market 
efficiency, and it is expected in a higher-income country, stock market become more 
3 See Bank-based and market-based financial systems: cross-country comparisons. 
4 Data source: Dermirg -Kunt, A. and R. Levine, 2001. Bank-based and market-based financial system: 
Cross-country comparisons. Dermirg -Kunt, A. and R. Levine (eds.)，Financial Structure and Economic 
Growth: A Cross-Country Comparison of Banks, Markets, and Development. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 
81-140 
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active and efficient and financial system is more developed. But the interesting finding is 
coefficient of market efficiency is negative and significant. In contrast to hypothesis 1， 
the results show that spinoff create more value in an inefficient external capital market 
rather than in an efficient external capital market. 
TABLE 10 HERE 
ii. Regression analysis for mergers {H2 and H3) 
As diversification increases the diversity of assets under management and thereby 
reduces the efficiency of the manager and increases the over-investment, it is expected 
mergers perform poorly in the internal capital market. If the external capital market were 
more efficient, it would record higher value losses. 
Table 11 presents the regressions results of the following cross-sectional regression 
is estimated: 
Ri = a + b (X Operating Performance)i + c (Market Size)i + d (Market Activity)i + e 
(Market Efficiency)i 
In regression 1，we analyze the effects on one year holding period return. The 
coefficient of change in operating performance is positive but insignificant. The 
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coefficient of market size and activities are 1.652 and -3.062, both are significant at 5% 
while the coefficient for market efficiency is insignificant. In regression 3，two-year stock 
market holding period return is positively related to the operating performance 
improvement and the market size while it is negatively related to the market activities. 
The coefficient of market size, activities and efficiency are 1.60 (significant at the 5% 
level), -3.136 (significant at the 5% level) and 1.292 respectively. 
The results show that the stock market performance is positively related to 
operating improvement and strongly related to the external market factors in a longer-
term. The external capital market produce mixed effects. Post-merger firms perform quite 
well in the large but with low trading activities market, such as South Africa^ in which 
the stock market is large and illiquid. Mergers incur losses in other countries with active 
but small stock markets, such as Korea and Germany^. The results support H3 but do not 
support that internal capital market is overwhelming inferior for all countries. 
TABLE 11 HERE 
B. Robustness 
5 According to Demirguc-Kunt and Levine's (2001) classification. 
6 According to Demirguc-Kunt and Levine's (2001) classification. 
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1. Regression analysis for spinoffs {HI and H3) 
In model 2 of Table 10，we test report the following cross-sectional regression: 
Ri = a + b (Is： Operating Performance)i + c (Market Size)i + d (Market Activity)i + e 
(Market Efficiency) i + f (Log of the Parent 's Assets) i +g (Spinoff Size)i +h (Focus 
Dummy)\ + j (development dummy)[ 
Because size and abnormal return may be correlated, we control for possible size 
effect by including the log of the parent's assets. This variable's coefficient is positive 
but insignificant in this model. Also, we control for spinoff size, which is a measure of 
the relative size of spun-off entity to the parent firm. The coefficient is also positive and 
insignificant. We include focus dummy variable, because there are several reasons to 
expect a differential performance across the focus increasing and the non-focus-
increasing spinoffs. Focus dummy equals to 1 if it is a focus-increasing spinoff, otherwise 
0. However, the coefficient on focus dummy shows that focus increase has no impact on 
the firm value. We also include development dummy in the regressions to examine the 
different effect of corporate spinoff on development countries and emerging markets. 
Development dummy equals to 1 if it is a developed country, otherwise 0. The results 
confirm that stock market returns are low in developed countries but high in emerging 
markets. It maybe due to that growth potential is high in emerging markets and the 
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profitability is good in the regions, thus the stock prices are buoyed up and abnormal 
returns remains sound. 
After controlling the above variables, improvement in operating performance is 
weakly related to the stock performance. Coefficient of market size and activities are 
remaining the same, still significant at the 5% level. The coefficient for market efficiency 
is —0.866，significant at the 5% level. Thus HI is rejected. The implication is that external 
capital markets increase the benefits of corporate diversification. 
2. Regression analysis for mergers {H2 and H3) 
We assess the robustness of our results by using the following regression: 
Ri = a + Operating Performance)i + c(Market Size)i + d(Market Activity)i + 
e(Market Efficiency)i + f(Log of the Target's Assets)i +g(Diversification Dummy)i + 
h(development dummy)� 
In regression 2 of Table 11，after controlling the target firm's asset size, whether it 
is an own industry merger and a developed country, only the coefficients of market size 
and activities are significant. In regression 4, two-year stock market holding period return 
is positively related to the operating performance improvement and the market size while 
it is negatively related to the market activities and the maturity of financial market. The 
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coefficient of market size, activities, efficiency and development dummy are 2.068 
(significant at the 5% level), -4.074 (significant at the 5% level), 1.912 (significant at the 
10% level) and -2.07 (significant at the 5% level) respectively. 
The results show that post-merger firms perform well in the large and efficient but 
with low trading activities emerging market. In all, our result support H3 but reject H2. 
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Chapter Five: Announcement period return and focus analysis of spinoffs and 
mergers 
A. Spinoffs 
Previous literature on Corporate Focus Hypothesis predicts that focus-increasing 
spinoff creates more value than non-focus-increasing spinoff. Some studies even dig out 
the truth about the effect of spinoff. Daley et al.'s (1997) results consistent with the 
hypothesis that spinoffs create value by removing unrelated businesses and allowing 
managers to focus attention on the core operation they are best suited to manage. Desai 
and Jain (1999) point out that change in operating performance is significantly positively 
associated with the change in focus. The disposition of non-core division that operates 
with a different SIC code to the parent is defined as increasing corporate focus. 
We are interested to test that if (1) spinoffs generate returns on the announcement 
period; (2) focus-increasing spinoffs generate higher value creation than non- focus-
increasing spinoffs in the long run; (3) operating performance change of focus-increasing 
firms are higher than non-focus-increasing firms, and (4) change in focus and operating 
performance affect the announcement period stock market performance. The results 
showed on the next few sections. 
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1. Announcement period abnormal returns for spinoffs 
Table 12 reports the buy-and-hold returns for intervals of 5-day, 11-day around 
announcement date for pre-spinoff entities. Over an eleven-day period, starting five days 
before and ending five days after the announcement day, pre-spinoff entities gain 
abnormal return of 1.59%. It represents markets react positively to the announcement of 
spinoff, in which spun-off companies are financed in the external capital markets, though 
evidences are not so strong. 
The return varies between focus-increasing firms and non-focus-increasing firms. 
The mean abnormal return for focus-increasing sample is 1.42% only and it is positive in 
forty-two percent of the cases. Non-focus-increasing sample earns average 3.71% return. 
Corporate Focus Hypothesis predicts that the performance increase should be found in 
the parents alone as the removal of non-core businesses allows parent managers to focus 
on the core operations. However, our results show that investors have a stronger 
positively reaction toward non-focus-increasing sample, maybe it is due to non-focus-
increase firms able to enhance market share and thus enhance profits. 
Over the five-day window, it seems the announcement has no impact on the stock 
prices because abnormal return for the entire sample is just 0.05%. All these values are 
somewhat lower than those reported in earlier studies. 
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TABLE 12 HERE 
2. Long-run stock market performance following spinoffs 
i. Long-run stock market performance of the pro-forma combined firms 
Table 13 presents summary statistics on the stock market performance for the focus 
increasing and non-focus-increasing pro-forma combined firms following spinoff. 
Abnormal return of focus increasing sub-sample (Panel A) are 7.49%, 1.51% and 22.08% 
over holding periods of one-, two- and three-years. The corresponding /-statistic of 
abnormal returns are 1.14，0.62 and 1.98. The first two numbers are insignificant while 
the later one is significant at the 5% level. Note that the last column of Panel A shows the 
percentage of positive abnormal returns for the full sample over the three-year period are 
64.4%, suggesting that the remarkable results are not driven by several large observations. 
As opposed to the focus-increasing sub-sample, non-focus-increasing sub-sample (Panel 
B) earns abnormal returns of -8.8%, -6.91% and 3.53% over the one-, two- and three-
year holding periods. 
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In consistent with those previous studies/ the greater value improvements are 
observed from focus-increasing firms while non-focus-increasing firms exhibit some 
degree of value reduction. 
TABLE 13HERE 
ii. Long-run stock market performance of the parents following spinoff 
Table 14 presents summary statistics on the stock market performance for the 
focus-increasing and non-focus-increasing parents following spinoff. The exceptionable 
about these holding period returns is the difference between focus-increasing and non-
focus-increasing sub-samples. Not surprisingly, abnormal returns of focus increasing 
parents (Panel A) are 33.92%, 8.25% and 23.24% over holding periods of one-, two- and 
three-years. The corresponding ^-statistic of abnormal returns are 1.19，1.36 and 2.8. The 
first two numbers are insignificant while the later one is statistically significant. Note that 
the last column of Panel A shows the percentage of positive abnormal returns for the sub-
sample over the three-year period are 60.7%, suggesting that the remarkable results are 
not driven by several large observations. As opposed to the focus-increasing parents, non-
7 See Desai and Jain (1999) and Daley et al. (1997). 
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focus-increasing parents (Panel B) earn negative abnormal returns of-10.72%, -10.89% 
and -10.46% over the same holding periods. In consistent with those previous studies, the 
greater value improvements are observed from focus-increasing parents while non-focus-
increasing parents exhibit some degree of value reduction. 
TABLE 14 HERE 
iii. Long-run stock market performance of the subsidiaries following spinoff 
Table 15 presents summary statistics on the stock market performance for the 
focus-increasing and non-focus-increasing subsidiaries. Panel A reports the results for 
subsidiaries spun-off from focus-increasing parents. Abnormal return of focus-increasing 
parents are 2.65%, -0.78% and 3.61% over holding periods of one-, two- and three-years, 
while non-focus-increasing parents (Panel B) earn abnormal returns of 6.56% (^-statistic 
of 1.07)，17.96% (stat is t ic of 1.99) and 40.49% (^-statistic of 1.73) over the same 
holding periods. 
These results provide additional information that subsidiaries of non-focus-
increasing sample outperform the subsidiaries of focus-increasing sample in the two- and 
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the three-year holding period following completion the spinoffs. Magnitudes are also 
larger in non-focusing increasing samples in absolute terms. 
TABLE 15 HERE 
3. Accounting performance around spinoff 
Table 16 presents summary statistics on the operating performance for the focus 
increasing and non-focus-increasing pro-forma combined firms around spinoffs. Upper 
part of panel A reports the results of ROA and AROA for combined firms from focus-
increasing parents. Mean AROA are -021%, 2.88% (significant at the 1% level), 2.76% 
(significant at the 10% level) and 1.03% while non-focus-increasing combined firms 
(upper part of Panel B) earn mean AROA of 1.98%, 1.16%, -3.35% and 13.99% on the 
year -1，year 0, year +1 and year +2 respectively. For focus-increasing spinoff, median 
AROA at year 0 and year +1 are 1.91% (significant at the 1% level) and 1.82% 
(significant at the 1% level) while that of non-focus-increasing combined firms are 2.52% 
(significant at the 10%) and 1.81% respectively. We can see significant outstanding 
operating performance for focus-increasing sub-sample on year 0 and year +1，and the 
significant outstanding performance mainly comes from the focus-increasing sub-sample. 
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Lower part of Panel B reports the results of AROA and A AROA for combined 
firms from focus-increasing parents. Median A AROA are 1.7% (significant at the 1% 
level), 1.8% (significant at the 1% level), -0.1% and -0.9% while non-focus-increasing 
parents (lower part of Panel B) earn median A AROA of 0.8%, 0.1%, -0.0% and -0.3% on 
the above mentioned period, respectively. There is significant performance improvement 
in the year of completing spinoff for the focus-increasing sub-sample. 
These results show that focus-increasing sample outperform the non-focus-
increasing sample. The reason is that focus-increasing parent concentrated on its core 
business, managerial skills are tailor made to the management of core business, and thus 
releasing the managers from non-core operation should improve corporate performance. 
That is why stock market performance of focus-increasing parents is better than that of 
non-focus-increasing parents. 
TABLE 16 HERE 
4. Cross-sectional regressions 
Similar to Dasai and Jain (1999), we examine the effects of change in focus and 
operating performance to the stock market performance by using the following cross-
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sectional regression: 
AR\ = a + b (Focus Dummy)\ + c ("A Operating Performance) 
0.008 0.003 0.16 
(0.31) (0.12) (2.66) 
厂statistic = 3.54, Adjusted R = 5.51% and Number of observations = 88. 
The left hand side variable AR� i s the eleven-day (day - 5 to +5) announcement period 
abnormal returns for firm i around the spinoff announcement. Focus dummy is an 
indicator variable set equal to one if the firm has a focus increase and zero otherwise. 
Change in operating performance is the difference between the post-spinoff and the 
corresponding pre-spinoff annual matching-firm adjusted return on assets. The statistics 
is shown in the parentheses under the estimated coefficients. 
The results show that market's reaction is positively significantly related to 
improvement in operating performance, but it is unrelated to change in focus. 
B. Mergers 
There is a substantial literature on diversification activities. Earlier papers^ working 
on announcement period stock market response to mergers show that shareholders gains 
8 See Jensen and Ruback (1983). 
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and the announcement of takeover. Besides, related diversified firms perform better than 
unrelated diversity. "Rumelt (1974) argues that related diversification affects value more 
positively than unrelated diversification because skills and resources can be used in 
related markets... the effects of reputation and economies of scope, which arise when the 
joint cost of producing two or more outputs is less than the sum of the costs of producing 
each output by i tself (Berger and Ofek, 1995, pp. 42). It is contrast to other studies that 
suggest diversification destroy firm value. 
In this section, we use mergers to test if (1) mergers generate returns on the 
announcement period; (2) own-industry mergers generates higher value creation than 
cross-industry mergers in the long run; (3) operating performance change of own-
industry mergers are higher than cross-industry mergers, and (4) change in diversification 
and operating performance affect the announcement period stock market performance. 
1. Announcement period abnormal returns for mergers 
Table 17 reports the buy-and-hold returns for intervals of 5-day, 11-day around 
announcement date for acquirer. Over an eleven-day period, starting five days before and 
ending five days after the announcement day, acquirers gain abnormal return of 4.71%. It 
represents markets react positively to the announcement of merger. The returns vary 
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between cross industry merge and own industry merge, though evidences are not so 
strong. The mean abnormal return for cross industry merge sub-sample is 10.51% that is 
greater than own industry merge sub-sample, which earns average 0.05% return only. 
TABLE 17 HERE 
2. Long-run stock market performance of mergers 
Stock market data for target firms are no longer available since target firms merged 
with acquirers, so cannot split our examination into two parts: target firms and acquirers, 
to see which kind of firms contribute more value to the combined firms. 
Table 18 presents summary statistics on the stock market performance for the cross 
industry and own industry post-merger firms. Abnormal return of cross industry mergers 
(Panel A) are 3.24%, 3.52% and 24.64% over holding periods of one-, two- and three-
years. The corresponding /-statistic of abnormal returns are 0.83，0.59 and 2.75. The first 
two numbers are insignificant while the later one is significant at the 1% level. As 
opposed to the cross industry merger, own industry merger (Panel B) earns abnormal 
returns of 6.64%, 9.8% and 22.2% over the one-, two- and three-year holding periods. 
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The corresponding /-statistic of abnormal returns are 1.32, 1.47 and 2.87. The first two 
numbers are insignificant while the later one is significant at the 1% level. 
The above results show that two sub-samples exhibit positive abnormal 
performance following merge. Neither cross industry merge or own industry merge under 
perform each other. 
TABLE 18 HERE 
3. Accounting performance around merger 
Upper part of panel A of Table 19 reports the results for combined firms from cross 
industry merge sub-sample. Mean AROA are 0.24%, 1.16% and 1.75% (significant at the 
10% level) while own industry merged combined firms (Panel B) earn mean AROA of 
3.33% (significant at the 1% level), 2.38% (significant at the 5% level) and 0.83% on 
year -1，year +1 and year +2 respectively. For focus-increasing spinoff, median AROA at 
year -1，year +1 and year +2 are 0.36% (significant at the 1% level), 0.37% and 0.03% 
(significant at the 1% level) while that of non-focus-increasing combined firms are 1.18% 
(significant at the 1%), 1.16% (significant at the 1% level) and 1.65% (significant at the 
1% level) respectively. We would see significant outstanding operating performance for 
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the entire sample around merge and the significant out performance is evenly distributed 
across two sub-samples. 
Lower part of panel A reports the results for combined firms from cross industry 
merge sub-sample. Median AAROA are 0.92%, -0.53%, 1.44% and 0.48% while non-
focus-increasing parents (Lower part of panel B) earn median AAROA of -0 .06%, -
0.55%, 0.37% and 0.38% on the above mentioned period, respectively. 
The above results show that the outstanding performance accompanied with merge. 
A similar pattern is observed when the cross industry and own industry merger are 
analyzed separately. Overall, the results partly explain that the stock market abnormal 
return following merge. 
TABLE 19 HERE 
4. Cross-sectional regressions 
Similar to spinoff, we examine the effects of changes in diversification and 
operating performance to the stock market performance by using the following cross-
sectional regression: 
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AR\ = a + b (Diversification Dummy)�+ c (A Operating Performance)-�. 
0.013 -0.119 1.215 
(0.16) (0.97) (2.48) 
F-statistic = 3.74，Adjusted R^ = 2.95% and Number of observations =181. 
where AR\ is the eleven-day (day - 5 to +5) announcement period abnormal returns for 
firm i around the merger announcement. Diversification dummy is an indicator variable 
set equal to one if it is an own industry merger and zero otherwise. Change in operating 
performance is the difference between the post-merger and the corresponding pre-merger 
annual matching firm adjusted return on assets. The �statistics is shown in the 
parentheses under the estimated coefficients. 
The results show that market's reaction is positively significantly related to 
improvement in operating performance, but it is unrelated to whether it is an own 
industry merger. 
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Chapter Six; Conclusion 
In this paper we used newly collected data on a cross-section of up to 21 countries 
to illustrate how value differ in the external capital market around the world. We examine 
the value of spinoff and merger firms respectively. Pro-forma combined firms of spinoff 
earn 9.81% abnormal return in a three-year period while the return for the parents are 
significant. Mergers on average earn a significant 23.24% abnormal return compared 
with the market return over the 1996-2003 period. 
Our results do not support hypothesis 1 that greater efficiency in external markets 
increases the net benefit of corporate spinoff. Instead, it appears that greater information 
asymmetry increases the benefits of spinoff or not to conduct corporate restructuring 
would be better. For the firms operating in developed capital markets, the costs of spinoff 
outweigh the benefits. Richer countries usually have more efficient markets, the rooms 
for improve operating performance and increase profitability is less than the poorer 
countries. As there is great capability for the developing countries to have earnings grow 
substantially, thus the stock price tends to grow more in an inefficient external market. 
In addition, corporate diversification benefit from a large and efficient stock market 
that is contrast to our hypothesis 2. The use of internal capital markets could lead to 
higher values for post-merger firms. In fact, corporations have introduced incentive 
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schemes for managements that avoid agency problems. Merges would bring along with 
scale effects to firms that are positive to the firm operation and value. 
On average, operating performance of post-spinoff firms improved relative to 
industry benchmarks and operating performance of post-merger firms are strong relative 
to their industry peers. The results are consistent with hypothesis 3 that operating 
performance improvements contribute to the increase infirm value. 
We also examine whether an increase in corporate focus is a good explanation for 





Summary Statistics for the Sample of 127 Spinoffs Over the Period 1996 to 2003 
The initial sample of spinoffs was identified from the SDC database. The final sample of 127 spinoffs 
satisfied the following criteria: (1) The spinoff involves creation of another public listed company; (2) 
announcement date and effective date can be identified; (3) firms do not operate in financial sector; (4) 
accounting data for both parents and subsidiaries must be available; (5) parents and subsidiaries operate at 
the same geographic region. 
Year Number of Spinoffs Year Number of Spinoffs 
1996 14 2000 19 
1997 13 2001 24 
1998 10 2002 19 




Summary statistics for descriptive variables 
Pre-spinoff values are reported at the latest year-end information prior to announcement date. Post-spinoff 
values are reported one full fiscal year after the effect date. 
Pre-spinoff Post-spinoff Changes 
Descriptive variables Parent Parent Spinoff Parent (post - pre) 
Assets (US$mil) Mean 8,183 8,184 4,145 -810 
Median 1,489 1,273 3,349 -18 
Std. dev. 18,970 14,152 19,551 7,534 
Spinoff size Mean -_ -- 0.297 --
(spinoff assets / sum of Median ~ ~ 0.209 — 
spinoff & parent assets) Std. dev. - “ 0.257 " 
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Table 12 
Summary Statistics for the Sample of 227 Mergers Over the Period 1996 to 2003 
This table reports the distribution by year of completion of mergers. The initial sample of mergers was 
identified from the SDC database. The final sample of 227 mergers satisfied the following criteria: (1) The 
merger targets on another public listed company; (2) announcement date and effective date can be 
identified; (3) firms do not operate in financial sector; (4) accounting data for both acquirers and targets 
must be available; (5) acquirers and targets operate at the same geographic region. 
Year Number of Mergers Year Number of Mergers 
1996 5 2000 47 
1997 10 2001 49 
1998 23 2002 37 
199 9 40 ^ [6 
— Total 227 
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Table 12 
Long-run stock market performance of the pro-forma combined firms following spinoff 
This table summarizes raw buy-and-hold returns (R) for the sample firms, raw buy-and-hold returns of the 
market index (MKT), corresponding abnormal returns (AR) together with t-statistic associated with the 
abnormal returns and percentage of positive abnormal returns (% + ve) over the periods following the 
month of ex-date. The returns of the parents and the subsidiaries are combined in proportion of their 
market value of equity at the end of the month of ex-date. the month of the ex-date. 
Time period No. of obs. R (%) MKT(%) AR (%) /-Stat % + ve 
All firms 
EX+ 1 toEX+ 12 101 5.23 2.23 3.01 1.27 49.5 
EX+ 1 to£:A'+24 2.80 3.42 1.93 0.47 54.2 
EX+ 1 ioEX+Z6 11.98 3.62 ^ 1.66* 51.4 
Note: Asterisks indicate significant different from zero at thelO%(*), 5%(**) and 1 %(***) level. 
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Table 5 
Long-run stock market performance of the parents following spinoffs 
This table summarizes raw buy-and-hold returns (R) for the sample firms, raw buy-and-hold returns of the 
market index (MKT), corresponding abnormal returns (AR) together with t-statistic associated with the 
abnormal returns and percentage of positive abnormal returns (% + ve) over the periods following the 
month of ex-date. The term parent means pre-spinoff and continuing entity. EXis the month of the ex-date. 
Time period No. of obs. R (%) MKT(%) AR (%) Z-Stat % + ve 
All parents 
EX+ 1 toEX+ 12 95 20.70 2.23 18.47 9.26*** 44.7 
EX+ 1 to£:A'+24 9.86 3.42 6.44 1.07 55.8 
EX+ 1 to EX+ 36 25.75 3.62 22.12 2.24** 56.3 
Note: Asterisks indicate significant different from zero at thelO%(*), 5%(**) and 1 %(***) level. 
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Table 6 
Stock market performance of the subsidiaries following spinoffs 
This table summarizes raw buy-and-hold returns (/?) for the sample firms, raw buy-and-hold returns of the 
market index {MKT), corresponding abnormal returns {AK) together with t-statistic associated with the 
abnormal returns and percentage of positive abnormal returns (% + ve) over the periods following the 
month of ex-date. The term subsidiary means the newly created entity following. EX is the month of the ex-
date. 
T ^ e period No. of obs. R (%) MKT(%) AR (%) "Stat % + ve 
All subsidiaries 
EX+ 1 toEX+ 12 103 2.66 2.23 0.43 0.41 46.7 
EX+ 1 to £ ^ + 2 4 7.23 3.42 3.81 1.22 53.8 
EX+ 1 to EX+36 15.37 3.62 11.75 1.73* 46.9 
Note: Asterisks indicate significant different from zero at thelO%(*), 5%(**) and 1 %(***) level. 
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Table 7 
Stock market performance of the post-merged combined firms 
This table summarizes raw buy-and-hold returns (R) for the sample firms, raw buy-and-hold returns of the 
market index (MKT), corresponding abnormal returns (AR) together with t-statistic associated with the 
abnormal returns and percentage of positive abnormal returns (% + ve) over the periods following the 
month of ex-date. EX is the month of the ex-date. 
Time period No.ofobs . R (%) MKT(%) AR (%) f-Stat % + ve 
Entire sample 
EX+ 1 toEX+ 12 182 3.99 -1.22 5.20 1.56 50.54 
EX+ 1 ioEX+24 173 -0.74 -7.92 7.18 1.57 56.50 
EX+ 1 to EX+ 36 150 U ^ -11.64 23.24 3.99*** 60.39 
Note: Asterisks indicate significant different from zero at thelO%(*), 5%(**) and 1 %(***) level. 
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Table 8 
Return-on-asset ratio (ROA) around spinoffs for the combined firm 
This table summarizes operating retum-to-asset ratio {ROA) and operating return-to-asset ratio (A ROA) 
for the full spinoffs sample following the spinoff year -1 to year +2, The retum-to-asset is defined as the 
ratio of the year-end operating income to the year-end total assets. In the post-spinoff period, the retum-to-
asset is just dividing sum of the operating income of the parent and subsidiaries by their combined year-
end book value of total assets. The industry mean or median value for all firms in the same two-digit SIC 
code from the corresponding spinoff firm is defined as benchmark. The significance of the mean is tested 
against zero by /-test and median is tested against zero using the Wilcoxon sign rank test. 
Relative year No. of obs. Unadjusted Industry-adjusted 
Mean (%) Median (%) Mean (%) Median (%) 一 
Panel A: ROA AROA 
Year-1 106 6.75*** 6.35 0.79 0 
YearO 7.47*** 7.70 2.81 1.88** 
Year+1 4.40** 6.46 0.60 1.60** 
Year +2 8.57*** 5.96 4.20 0.70 
Panel B: /^rqA A AROA 
From year—1 to+1 106 -1.93 0.26 -0.98 1.23* 
From yea r -1 to 0 0.52 0.74** 1.78 1.22** 
From year 0 t o + 1 -2.35 -0.03 -2.22 -0.02 
From year +1 to +2 ^ -OM ^ -0.94** 
Note: Asterisks indicate significant different from zero at the 10%(*)，5%(**) and 1 %(***) level. 
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Table 9 
Return-to-asset ratio ( A ROA) around merges for the combined firm 
This table summarizes retum-to-asset ratio (ROA) and operating retum-to-asset ratio (A ROA) for the full 
mergers sample following the spinoff year-1 to year +2. The retum-to-asset is defined as the ratio of the 
year-end operating income to the year-end total assets. In the pre-merger period, the retum-to-asset is just 
dividing sum of the operating income of the acquirer and target firms by their combined year-end book 
value of total assets. The mean and median value for all firms in the same two-digit SIC code from the 
corresponding merge firm is introduced as the industry benchmark. The significance of the mean is using a 
i-test and median is tested against zero using the Wilcoxon sign rank test. 
Relative year No. of obs. Unadjusted Industry-adjusted 
Mean (%) Median (%) Mean (%) Median (%) 
Panel A: ROA AROA 
Year-1 190 7.15*** 7.19 2.07*** 1.01*** 
Year+1 4.83*** 5.52 1.88** 0.79*** 
Year+2 4.0*** 5.41 1.21 1.15*** 
Panel B: A/?0/4 AAROA 
From year-1 to+1 190 -2.28*** -1.26 -0.16 -0.05 
From year-1 to 0 -1.32** -0.83 -0.23 -0.55 
From year 0 to+1 -0.96* -0.03 0.09 0.46 
From year +1 to +2 -0.94 -0.70 0 J 8 
Note: Asterisks indicate significant different from zero at the 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1 %(***) level. 
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Table 10 
OLS Regressions on the long-run stock market performance of Spinoffs 
Dependent variable is one-year stock market abnormal return of the pro-forma combined firm. Change in 
operating performance is the difference between the post-spinoff and the corresponding pre-spinoff annual 
matching-firm adjusted return on assets. Market capitalization as a share of GDP equals the ratio of the 
value of domestic equities (that are traded on domestic exchanges) to GDP. Total value traded as a share of 
GDP equals the value of the trades of domestic equities on domestic exchanges divided by GDP. Turnover 
ratio equals the value of the trades of domestic equities on domestic exchanges as a share of the value of 
equities. Log of the parent's assets is a control variable for possible size effects. Spinoff size is the spinoff 
firm's post-spinoff assets divided by the sum of parent and spinoff assets. Focus dummy equals to 1 if it is 
a focus-increasing spinoff, otherwise 0. Development dummy equals to 1 if it is a developed country, 
otherwise O.The t-statistics are presented in the parentheses under the estimated coefficient. 
(1) (2) 
Constant 0.307 0.494 
(1.45) (1.11) 
AROA (-1,1) 0.423** 0.326* 
(2.39) (1.75) 
Market capitalization as a share of GDP -0.280 -0.347 
(-0.99) (-1.17) 
Total value traded as a share of GDP 0.615 0.723 
(1.19) (1.35) 
Turnover ratio -0.707** -0.791** 
(-2.03) (-2.01) 
Log of Parent Assets 0.051 
(1.15) 
Spinoff Size 0.145 
(0.71) 
Focus Dummy 0.160 
(1.26) 
Development Dummy -0.616* 
(-1.8) 
Adjusted R^ 0.058 0.0672 
No. of observations ^ ^ 
Note: Asterisks indicate significant different from zero at the 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1 %(***) level. 
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Table 11 
OLS Regressions on the long-run stock market performance of mergers 
Dependent variable is one-, two- and three-year stock market abnormal returns of the post-merge combined 
firm. Change in operating performance is the difference between the post-spinoff and the corresponding 
pre-spinoff annual matching-firm adjusted return on assets. Market capitalization as a share of GDP equals 
the ratio of the value of domestic equities (that are traded on domestic exchanges) to GDP. Total value 
traded as a share of GDP equals the value of the trades of domestic equities on domestic exchanges divided 
by GDP. Turnover ratio equals the value of the trades of domestic equities on domestic exchanges as a 
share of the value of equities. Log of the target's assets is a control variable for possible size effects. 
Diversification dummy equals to 1 if it is an own industry merger, otherwise 0. Development dummy 
equals to 1 if it is a developed country, otherwise 0. The t-statistics are presented in the parentheses under 
the estimated coefficient. 
/?/(! year) Ri{2 year) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
-0.456 -0.239 -0.700 -0.101 
Constant (-1.08) (-0.38) (-1.43) (-0.15) 
0.370 0.361 0.673** 0.671** 
AROA (.,.,) (1.39) (1.32) (2.21) (2.18) 
0.387* 0.369* 
AROA (,.2) (1.81) (1.71) 
Market capitalization as a share 1.652** 1.636** 1.600** 2.222** 
of GDP (2.45) (2.15) (2.00) (2.53) 
Total value traded as a share of-3.062** -2.981* -3.136** -4.253** 
GDP (-2.38) (-2.01) (-2.06) (-2.49) 
0.604 0.445 1.292 2.139 
Turnover ratio (0.79) (0.45) (1.47) (1.90) 
-0.000 0.000 
Log of Target's Assets (0.13) (-0.00) 
-0.013 -0.001 
Diversification Dummy (-0.18) (0.01) 
-0.159 -1.073** 
Development Dummy (-0.34) (-2.07) 
Adjusted r2 0.0725 0.1064 0.443 0.041 
No. of observations 175 m m 
Note: Asterisks indicate significant different from zero at the 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1 %(***) level. 
53 
Table 12 
Announcement Period Returns for pre-spinoff entities Over the period 1996-2003. 
This table summarizes the announcement period buy-and-hold returns (R) for the sample firms, market 
index return {MKT), corresponding announcement date abnormal returns (AR) together with t-statistic and 
percentage of positive abnormal returns (% + ve) for the entire sample and two sub-samples respectively. 
The announcement date shown in SDC dataset is defined as day 0. The spinoff is classified as a focus 
increasing spinoff when the two-digit SIC code of subsidiary is different from the two-digit SIC code of 
the parent. Means are tested against zero by the appropriate /-statistic. 
Sample No. of obs. /? (%) MKT{%) AR (%) /-Stat % + ve 
Panel A: All firms 
day -5 to 5 109 2.24 0.65 1.59 1.36 49.5 
day - 2 to 2 0.85 0.80 0.05 0.06 51.4 
Panel B: Focus-increasing sub-sample 
d a y - 5 to 5 81 1.61 0.31 1.42 0.84 41.7 
da y -2 to 2 1.05 0.73 0.35 0.25 54.3 
Panel C: Non-focus-increasing sub-sample 
d a y - 5 to 5 28 5.07 1.36 3.71 1.69* 57.1 
d a y - 2 to 2 \ m 
Note: Asterisks indicate significant different from zero at the 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1 %(***) level. 
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Table 12 
Long-run stock market performance of the pro-forma combined firms following spinoff 
This table summarizes raw buy-and-hold returns (R) for the sample firms, raw buy-and-hold returns of the 
market index {MKT), corresponding abnormal returns {AR) together with t-statistic associated with the 
abnormal returns and percentage of positive abnormal returns (% + ve) over the periods following the 
month of ex-date. Focus increasing and non-focus-increasing are reported respectively. The focus-
increasing sample consists parents that has the different two-digit SIC code as the spun-off subsidiaries. 
The remaining parents are classified as the non-focus-increasing sample. The term parent means pre-
spinoff and continuing entity. EX is the month of the ex-date. 
Time period No.ofobs. R (%) MKT(Vo) AR (%) ？-Stat % + ve 
Panel A: Focus-increasing sub-sample 
EX+ 1 toEX+ 12 73 7.53 0.04 7.49 1.14 60 
EX+ 1 t o £ ; r + 2 4 4.37 2.86 1.51 0.62 61.1 
EX+ 1 t o £ ; r + 3 6 33.35 11.27 22.08 1.98** 64.4 
Panel B: Non-focus-increasing sub-sample 
EX+ 1 toEX+ 12 26 -1.79 7.01 -8.80 1.21 41.7 
EX+ 1 to £ ^ + 2 4 -2.89 4.02 -6.91 1.26 51.4 
EX+ 1 to 权 + 3 6 ^ ^ ^ 53.8 
Note: Asterisks indicate significant different from zero at thelO%(*), 5%(**) and 1 %(***) level. 
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Table 14 
Stock market performance of the parents following spinoffs 
This table summarizes raw buy-and-hold returns (/?) for the sample firms, raw buy-and-hold returns of the 
market index (MKT), corresponding abnormal returns (AR) together with t-statistic associated with the 
abnormal returns and percentage of positive abnormal returns (% + ve) over the periods following the 
month of ex-date. Focus increasing and non-focus-increasing are reported respectively. The focus-
increasing sample consists parents that has the different two-digit SIC code as the spun-off subsidiaries. 
The remaining parents are classified as the non-focus-increasing sample. The term parent means pre-
spinoff and continuing entity. The term subsidiary means the newly created entity following spinoff. EX\s 
the month of the ex-date. 
Time period No. of obs. R (%) MKT{%) AR (%) f-Stat % + ve 
Panel A: Focus-increasing parents 
EX+ 1 XoEX+ 12 72 33.96 0.04 33.92 1.19 48.1 
EX+ 1 \oEX+2A 11.11 2.86 8.25 1.36 56.1 
伙 + l t o £ X + 36 26.07 2.83 23.24 2.80*** 60.7 
Panel B: Non-focus-increasing parents 
EX+ 1 12 23 -3.71 7.01 -10.72 -1.39 50 
EX+ 1 XoEX+lA -6.87 4.02 -10.89 -0.82 52.6 
EX+ 1 to EX+ 36 OM 11.27 -10.46 -0.62 40 
Note: Asterisks indicate significant different from zero at thelO%(*), 5%(**) and 1 %(***) level. 
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Table 15 
Stock market performance of the subsidiaries following spinoffs 
This table summarizes raw buy-and-hold returns (R) for the sample firms, raw buy-and-hold returns of the 
market index {MKT), corresponding abnormal returns {AR) together with t-statistic associated with the 
abnormal returns and percentage of positive abnormal returns (% + ve) over the periods following the 
month of ex-date. Focus-increasing and non-focus-increasing sub-samples are reported respectively. The 
focus-increasing sample consists subsidiaries that has the different two-digit SIC code as those parents. The 
remaining subsidiaries are classified as the non-focus-increasing sample. The term parent means pre-spinoff 
and continuing entity. The term subsidiary means the newly created entity following spinoff. EX is the 
month of the ex-date. 
Time period No. of obs. R (%) MKT(%) AR (%) "Stat % + ve 
Panel A: Focus-increasing subsidiaries 
EX+ 1 toEX+ 12 77 -2.69 0.04 2.65 -0.09 42.9 
EX+ 1 t o£A '+24 2.08 2.86 -0.78 0.44 50 
EX+ 1 {oEX+2>e 6.44 2.83 3.61 0.70 40.4 
Panel B: Non-focus-increasing subsidiaries 
EX+ 1 XoEX+ 12 26 13.57 7.01 6.56 1.07 59.1 
EX+ 1 {oEX+lA 21.98 4.02 17.96 1.99** 68.8 
EX+ 1 to 汉 + 3 6 11.27 40.49 1.73* 69.23 
Note: Asterisks indicate significant different from zero at thelO%(*), 5%(**) and 1 %(***) level. 
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Table 16 
Operating earning-on-asset ratio (ROA) around spinoffs for the combined firm 
This table summarizes retum-to-asset ratio (ROA) and changes in retum-to-asset ratio (A穴CM) for both 
focus-increasing sample and non-focus-increasing sample following the spinoff. The focus-increasing sub-
sample consists of spinoffs that parent firms operate in different two-digit SIC code as the newly created 
subsidiaries. The remaining spinoffs are classified as the non-focus-increasing sub-sample. The retum-to-
asset is defined as the ratio of the year-end operating income to the year-end total assets. In the post-spinoff 
period, the retum-to-asset is just dividing sum of the operating income of the parent and subsidiaries by 
their combined year-end book value of total assets. The industry mean or median value for all firms in the 
same two-digit SIC code from the corresponding spinoff firm is defined as benchmark. The significance of 
the mean is tested against zero by /-test and median is tested against zero using the Wilcoxon sign rank test. 
Relative year No. of obs. Unadjusted Industry-adjusted 
Mean (%) Median (%) Mean (%) Median (%) 
Panel A: Pre- and post-spinoff retum-on-asset for the focus-increasing sub-sample 
ROA AROA 
Year-1 70 6.08*** 6.29 -0.27 -0.05 
YearO 6.58*** 6.42 2.88*** 1.91*** 
Year+1 6.60*** 6.45 2.76* 1.82*** 
Year +2 4.80*** 5.57 1.03 1.01 
AROA AAROA 
From year-1 to +1 70 -0.8 0.7 1.0 1.7*** 
From year-1 to 0 0.4 1.1 2.7** 1.8*** 
From year 0 to +1 -1.2 0.0 1.6 -0.1 
From year +1 to +2 -2.5 -0.4* -2.0 -0.9 
Panel B: Pre- and post-spinoff retum-on-asset for the non-focus-increasing sub-sample 
ROA AROA 
Year-1 36 7.97*** 7.31 1.98 3.15 
YearO 7.22 9.24 1.16 2.52* 
Year+1 2.57 8.13 -3.35 1.81 
Year +2 19.53* 7.85 13.99 0.86 
AROA AAROA 
From year—1 to+1 36 -5.3 -0.3 -4.9 0.8 
From year—1 to 0 -0.7 0.2 -0.1 0.1 
From year 0 to +1 -4.5 -0.7 -4.2 -0.0 
From year+1 to +2 ^ ]2J ^ 
Note: Asterisks indicate significant different from zero at the 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1 %(***) level. 
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Table 17 
Announcement Period Returns for 236 Mergers Over the period 1996-2003. 
This table summarizes the announcement period buy-and-hold returns (R) for the sample firms, market 
index return {MKT), corresponding announcement date abnormal returns {AR) together with t-statistic and 
percentage of positive abnormal returns (% + ve) for the entire sample and two sub-samples respectively. 
The announcement date shown in SDC dataset is defined as day 0. The cross industry merge sub-sample 
consists targets that has the different two-digit SIC code as those acquirers. The remaining mergers are 
classified as the own industry merge sub-sample. The term acquirer means the firm that acquires another 
firm and continuing entity. The term target means the firm that merged with acquirer and no longer exists. 
Means are tested against zero by the appropriate f-statistic. 
Sample No. of obs. R (%) MKT(%) AR (%) ^Stat % + ve 
Panel A: All firms 
d a y - 5 to 5 236 5.02 0.31 4.71 1.0 47.88 
day -2 to 2 236 0.47 0.05 0.42 0.68 50.42 
Panel B: Cross industry merger sample 
d a y - 5 to 5 105 11.09 0.59 10.51 1.0 47.6 
day -2 to 2 105 0.55 0.02 0.53 0.65 53.33 
Panel C: Own industry merger sample 
d a y - 5 to 5 131 0.15 0.09 0.05 0.05 46.67 
day -2 to 2 B 1 0.40 0.07 0.33 0.37 48.09 
Note: Asterisks indicate significant different from zero at the 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1 %(***) level. 
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Table 18 
Stock market performance of the post-merged combined firms 
This table summarizes raw buy-and-hold returns (R) for the sample firms, raw buy-and-hold returns of the 
market index (MKT), corresponding abnormal returns (AR) together with t-statistic associated with the 
abnormal returns and percentage of positive abnormal returns (% + ve) over the periods following the 
month of ex-date. Cross industry merge and own industry merge sub-samples are reported respectively. The 
cross industry merge sub-sample consists targets that has the different two-digit SIC code as those 
acquirers. The remaining mergers are classified as the own industry merge sub-sample. The term acquirer 
means the firm that acquires another firm and continuing entity. The term target means the firm that merged 
with acquirer and no longer exists. EX is the month of the ex-date. 
Time period No. of obs. R (%) MKT{%) AR (%) /-Stat % + ve 
Panel A: Cross industry merger sample 
EX+ 1 \oEX+ 12 77 4.11 0.86 3.24 0.83 48.7 
EX+ 1 \oEX+2A -1.35 -4.87 3.52 0.59 51.4 
EX+ 1 t o £ A ' + 3 6 16.14 -8.5 24.64 2.75*** 59.4 
Panel B: Own industry merger sample 
EX+ 1 to£:A'+ 12 105 3.90 -2.74 6.64 1.32 49.5 
EX+ 1 XoEX+lA -0.30 -10.10 9.80 1.47 58.4 
EX+ 1 XoEX+2>6 -13.98 22.20 2.87*** 59.3 
Note: Asterisks indicate significant different from zero at thelO%(*), 5%(**) and 1 %(***) level. 
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Table 12 
Changes in operating earning-to-asset ratio (AROA) around merger for the combined firm 
This table summarizes operating retum-to-asset ratio (ROA) and operating retum-to-asset ratio (A ROA) 
for both cross industry merge sample and own industry merge sample following merge. The cross industry 
merge sample consists mergers that acquirer firms operate in different two-digit SIC code as the target 
firms. The remaining mergers are classified as the own industry merge sample. The retum-to-asset is 
defined as the ratio of the year-end operating income to the year-end total assets. In the pre-merger period, 
the retum-to-asset is just dividing sum of the operating income of the acquirer and target firms by their 
combined year-end book value of total assets. The mean and median value for all firms in the same two-
digit SIC code from the corresponding merge firm is introduced as the industry benchmark. The 
significance of the mean is using a /-test and median is tested against zero using the Wilcoxon sign rank 
test. 
Relative year No. of obs. Unadjusted Industry-adjusted 
Mean (%) Median (%) Mean (%) Median (%) 
Panel A: Pre- and post-merger retum-on-asset for the cross industry merge sub-sample 
ROA AROA 
Year-1 83 6.49*** 7.19 0.24 0.36*** 
Year+l 5.29*** 6.91 1.16 0.37 
Year +2 5.49*** 5.99 1.75* 0.03*** 
^ROA A AROA 
From year-1 to+1 -1.2 -0.84 0.92 0.92 
From year-1 to 0 -1.16 -0.53 -0.53 -0.53 
From year 0 to +1 -0.04 0.39 1.44 1.44 
From year +1 to +2 -0.45 -0.10 0.48 0.48 
Panel B: Pre- and post-spinoff retum-on-asset for the own industry merge sub-sample 
ROA AROA 
Year-1 107 7.67 7.30 3.33*** 1.18*** 
Year+l 4.49 4.98 2.38** 1.16*** 
Year+2 2.90 4.66 0.83 1.65*** 
AROA AAROA 
From year—1 to+1 -3.12*** -1.78 -0.91 -0.06 
From year-1 to 0 -1.45* -0.85 -0.02 -0.55 
From year 0 to +1 -1.67** -0.47 -0.84 0.37 
From year +1 to +2 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Note: Asterisks indicate significant different from zero at the 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1 %(***) level. 
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